A
Special Report Published by The American Gold
Trust
"I would tell audiences that we were
facing not a bubble but froth - lots of small, local bubbles that
never grew to a scale that could threaten the health of the overall
economy." Alan Greenspan, The Age of Turbulence.
That used to be Mr. Greenspan's view of the US
housing bubble. He was wrong, alas. So how bad might this downturn
get? To answer this question we should ask a true bear. My favorite
one is Nouriel Roubini of New York University's Stern School of
Business, founder of RGE monitor.
Recently, Professor Roubini's scenarios have
been dire enough to make the flesh creep. But his thinking deserves
to be taken seriously. He first predicted a US recession in
July 2006*. At
that time, his view was extremely controversial. It is so no
longer. Now he states that there is "a rising probability of a
'catastrophic' financial and economic outcome"**. The
characteristics of this scenario are, he argues: "A vicious
circle where a deep recession makes the financial losses more
severe and where, in turn, large and growing financial losses and a
financial meltdown make the recession even more
severe."
Prof Roubini is even fonder of lists than I am. Here are
his 12 - yes, 12 - steps to financial
disaster.
Step one is the worst
housing recession in US history. House prices will, he says, fall
by 20 to 30 per cent from their peak, which would wipe out between
$4,000bn and $6,000bn in household wealth. Ten million households
will end up with negative equity and so with a huge incentive to
put the house keys in the post and depart for greener fields. Many
more home-builders will be bankrupted.
Step two would be further
losses, beyond the $250bn-$300bn now estimated, for sub-prime
mortgages. About 60 per cent of all mortgage origination between
2005 and 2007 had "reckless or toxic features", argues
Prof Roubini. Goldman Sachs estimates mortgage losses at $400bn.
But if home prices fell by more than 20 per cent, losses would be
bigger. That would further impair the banks' ability to offer
credit.
Step three would be big
losses on unsecured consumer debt: credit cards, auto loans,
student loans and so forth. The "credit crunch" would
then spread from mortgages to a wide range of consumer
credit.
Step four would be the
downgrading of the monoline insurers, which do not deserve the AAA
rating on which their business depends. A further $150bn write-down
of asset-backed securities would then
ensue.
Step five would be the meltdown of
the commercial property market, while step six would be bankruptcy
of a large regional or national bank.
Step seven would be big losses on
reckless leveraged buy-outs. Hundreds of billions of dollars of
such loans are now stuck on the balance sheets of financial
institutions.
Step eight would be a wave of
corporate defaults. On average, US companies are in decent shape,
but a "fat tail" of companies has low profitability and
heavy debt. Such defaults would spread losses in "credit
default swaps", which insure such debt. The losses could be
$250bn. Some insurers might go bankrupt.
Step nine would be a meltdown in the
"shadow financial system". Dealing with the distress of
hedge funds, special investment vehicles and so forth will be made
more difficult by the fact that they have no direct access to
lending from central banks.
Step 10 would be a further collapse
in stock prices. Failures of hedge funds, margin calls and shorting
could lead to cascading falls in prices.
Step 11 would be a drying-up of
liquidity in a range of financial markets, including interbank and
money markets. Behind this would be a jump in concerns about
solvency.
Step 12 would be "a vicious circle of
losses, capital reduction, credit contraction, forced liquidation
and fire sales of assets at below fundamental
prices".
These, then, are 12 steps to meltdown. In
all, argues Prof Roubini: "Total losses in the financial
system will add up to more than $1,000bn and the economic recession
will become deeper more protracted and severe." This, he
suggests, is the "nightmare scenario" keeping Ben
Bernanke and colleagues at the US Federal Reserve awake. It
explains why, having failed to appreciate the dangers for so long,
the Fed has lowered rates by 2 points this year. This is insurance
against a financial meltdown.
Is this kind of scenario at least plausible? It is.
Furthermore, we can be confident that it would, if it came to pass,
end all stories about "decoupling". If it lasts 18
months, as Prof Roubini warns, offsetting policy action in the rest
of the world would be too little, too late.
Can the Fed head this danger off? In a subsequent
piece, Prof Roubini gives eight reasons why it cannot***. (He
really loves lists!)
These are, in brief:
1) US monetary easing is constrained by risks to
the dollar and inflation;
2)aggressive easing deals only with illiquidity,
not insolvency;
3) The monoline insurers will lose their credit
ratings, with dire consequences;
4) overall losses will be too large for sovereign
wealth funds to deal with;
5) public intervention is too small to stabilize
housing losses;
6) the Fed cannot address the problems of the
shadow financial system;
7) regulators cannot find a good middle way between
transparency over losses and regulatory forbearance, both of which
are needed;
8) the transactions-oriented financial system is
itself in deep crisis.
The risks are indeed high and the ability
of the authorities to deal with them more limited than most people
hope. This is not to suggest that there are no ways out.
Unfortunately, they are poisonous ones. In the last resort,
governments resolve financial crises. This is an iron law. Rescues
can occur via overt government assumption of bad debt, inflation,
or both. Japan chose the first, much to the distaste of its
ministry of finance. But Japan is a creditor country whose savers
have complete confidence in the solvency of their government. The
US, however, is a debtor. It must keep the trust of foreigners.
Should it fail to do so, the inflationary solution becomes
probable. This is quite enough to explain why gold is $920 an
ounce.
The connection between the bursting of the
housing bubble and the fragility of the financial system has
created huge dangers, for the US and the rest of the world. The US
public sector is now coming to the rescue, led by the Fed. In the
end, they will succeed. But the journey is likely to be wretchedly
uncomfortable.